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Did U.S. Bank Supervisors Get
Tougher during the Credit Crunch?
Did They Get Easier during the
Banking Boom? Did It Matter
to Bank Lending?
Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle,
and Joseph M. Scalise
9.1 Introduction
The main goals of bank supervision are generally to act as a delegated
monitor on behalf of insured depositors or other stakeholders, to protect
the safety and soundness of the ﬁnancial system, and to counteract the
moral hazard incentives created by the government safety net. However,
changes in supervisory policy also may have signiﬁcant eﬀects on macro-
economic or regional economic health if banks respond by altering their
lending behavior. These additional eﬀects may be intended or unintended.
For example, supervisors may intend for some risky institutions to reduce
their lending. However, if too many institutions reduce their supplies of
credit simultaneously, this may create an unintended credit crunch or re-
cession. Alternatively, supervisors may try to stimulate lending through
supervisory easing. We discuss below some reasons to suspect that super-
visory changes over the last decade or so may have had signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the overall lending of the U.S. banking industry.
The purpose of this research is to investigate this possibility by testing
301three hypotheses about whether supervisors changed their policies and
whether these policy changes aﬀected bank lending behavior:
Hypothesis 1: U.S. bank supervisors got tougher on banks during the
credit crunch period of 1989–92, treating banks of a given ﬁnancial con-
dition more harshly than in previous years.
Hypothesis 2: U.S. bank supervisors got easier on banks during the boom
period of 1993–98, treating banks of a given ﬁnancial condition less
harshly than in prior periods.
Hypothesis 3: Changes in supervisory toughness, if they did occur,
changed bank lending behavior in the predicted directions.
We test these hypotheses using information on the supervisory process,
conﬁdential data on classiﬁed assets and CAMEL ratings from bank ex-
aminations, bank balance sheet and income data, and other variables
for the condition of the bank, its state, and its region over the period
1986–98.
Although we test these hypotheses separately, they are all intertwined in
the overall question of the eﬀects of changes in supervision. Under the
ﬁrst two hypotheses, there are signiﬁcant changes in supervisory policy,
and under the third hypothesis, these changes had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
bank lending. If these hypotheses are true, they may help explain part of
the observed wide swings in bank lending to business during the 1990s,
and may imply a larger role for ﬁnancial supervision in the performance
of the economy than was previously thought.
To put these issues into context, the period around 1989–92 is often
referred to as a credit crunch in the United States, in which commercial
banks substantially reduced their lending to business customers, although
some researchers choose slightly diﬀerent dates for the credit crunch pe-
riod. From 1989 to 1992, domestic commercial and industrial (C&I) loans
held by U.S. banks fell by about 23 percent in real terms. This decline may
have been particularly diﬃcult for bank-dependent small and medium-
sized businesses, which often have few alternatives for external ﬁnance.
Rough estimates suggest declines in business loans to borrowers with bank
credit less than $1 million on the order of 38 percent (Berger, Kashyap,
and Scalise 1995). Surveys of small business owners also suggest that it
was more diﬃcult for these ﬁrms to obtain credit during this time (e.g.,
Dunkelberg and Dennis 1992; Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk 1998). As dis-
cussed in the literature review in section 9.4, a number of hypotheses for
this decline in bank credit have been tested, but very few of the tests used
supervisory data.
An increase in supervisory toughness could explain a reduction in lend-
ing as follows. An unfavorable examination rating may be burdensome to
a bank because supervisors may require poorly rated institutions to take
costly actions to improve their condition (e.g., raising additional equity
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in some proﬁtable activities by prompt corrective action rules or supervi-
sory discretion. Banks may try to reverse the supervisory burdens of an
unfavorable rating by reducing their perceived risk, and one way to do so
is to reduce lending.
This explanation may be broader than it ﬁrst appears because it may
incorporate some of the changes in capital requirements and other regula-
tory changes during the credit crunch period. To the extent that these regu-
latory changes were enforced through the supervisory process by assigning
worse CAMEL ratings for the same risk-based capital ratios, leverage cap-
ital ratios, and other ﬁnancial ratios, they may be captured by our tests.
In addition, more classiﬁed assets or more serious classiﬁcations from
an unfavorable examination may force a bank to shift funds from equity
to its allocation for loan and lease losses (ALLL). Because equity counts
in full as Tier 1 equity under risk-based capital guidelines and ALLL
counts only as Tier 2 capital up to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets, the
shift may directly reduce regulatory capital and require the bank to reduce
lending or shrink to comply with capital regulations.
There may also have been a reduction in supervisory toughness during
the banking boom period of 1993–1998, consistent with hypothesis 2. In
1993, the main federal supervisors of banks and thrifts (Oﬃce of the
Comptroller of the Currency [OCC], Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion [FDIC], Federal Reserve Board [FRB], and Oﬃce of Thrift Supervi-
sion [OTS]) formally recognized a problem of credit availability and began
a joint program directed at dealing with this problem. The program fo-
cused on ﬁve areas in which agencies would take actions to alleviate insti-
tutions’ apparent reluctance to lend. The program (a) removed impedi-
ments to lending to small- and medium-sized businesses, (b) reduced
appraisal requirements for real estate lending, (c) eased the appeals of
examination decisions, (d) streamlined examination processes and proce-
dures, and (e) reduced paperwork and regulatory burden associated with
the supervisory process (Interagency Policy Statement on Credit Availabil-
ity, 10 March 1993). As a speciﬁc example of the implementation of this
program, banks that were well or adequately capitalized with satisfactory
CAMEL ratings of 1 or 2 (most banks) were allowed to make and carry
some loans to small- and medium-sized businesses (loans to borrowers
with bank credit less than $900,000) with only minimal documentation,
exempt from examiner criticism for doing so up to some limits (e.g., up to
20 percent of the bank’s capital). Beyond these limits and for institutions
not qualifying because of insuﬃcient capital or CAMEL ratings, devia-
tions from standard documentation could be made without examiner criti-
cism for loans to some customers with past experience with the bank (In-
teragency Policy Statement on Credit Availability, 1993). This policy may
be interpreted as an easing of supervision that may increase lending to
U.S. Bank Supervisors 3031. These numbers may slightly overstate the growth in small business lending. Although
we are able to deﬂate the dollar values of loans to put them in real terms, the cutoﬀ of bank
credit less than $1 million remains in nominal terms on the Call Report form.
relationship-type small and medium-sized business borrowers. In 1993,
bank Call Report forms were also amended to begin collecting data each
June on small business loans.
From 1993 through the end of our sample in 1998, lending by the U.S.
banking industry increased substantially, and the industry enjoyed record
proﬁtability. Total domestic C&I loans rose by about 50 percent in real
dollars, more than recovering from its 23 percent drop during the credit
crunch period. However, small business loans may not have recovered
quite as well, with business loans to borrowers with bank credit less than
$1 million (as collected on the June Call Reports) rising only about 14
percent in real terms, and falling as a percentage of bank gross total assets
from about 4.4 percent to about 3.8 percent.1
A number of hypotheses for the improvements in bank proﬁtability dur-
ing the 1993–98 boom period have been advanced, including favorable
macroeconomic conditions, exercise of market power in pricing, a shift
toward higher risk–higher expected return investments, and improvements
in the quality of banking services (Berger et al. 2000; Berger and Mester
2001). However, little attention has been paid to the possible role of
changes in the supervisory process on bank lending behavior. The increase
in lending may have occurred in part because of the supervisors’ joint
program or because supervisors became easier in their assessments in
other ways. If banks were assigned more favorable CAMEL examination
ratings and lower classiﬁed assets for a given ﬁnancial condition, this may
have encouraged banks to increase their lending. To our knowledge,
hypotheses 2 (decline in toughness during the boom) and 3 (it mattered to
bank lending) have not previously been tested using data from the boom
period.
To test for changes in supervisory toughness (hypotheses 1 and 2), we
control for bank ﬁnancial condition and other information that might be
used by supervisors. We run weighted least squares regression equations
for classiﬁed assets and ordered logit equations for CAMEL ratings, and
test whether supervisors changed their classiﬁed assets or assigned diﬀer-
ent CAMEL ratings during the credit crunch and boom periods, control-
ling for the bank’s ﬁnancial condition and economic environment.
Our econometric models mimic as closely as possible the information
used in the supervisory process, including the levels, trends, and peer
group percentile ranks of all the key balance sheet and income variables
speciﬁed in the oﬀ-site and on-site supervisory procedures. It is important
to include these variables, because if any important items used by supervi-
sors in setting the ratings are excluded, the test results may be biased. For
304 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scaliseexample, if a key balance sheet variable that worsened during the credit
crunch period were excluded from the analysis, this may give a false read-
ing of a toughening of supervisory treatment, since the rating may have
changed because of the excluded variable rather than a change in supervi-
sory toughness.
To test whether any changes in supervisory toughness aﬀected bank
lending behavior (hypothesis 3), we run ordinary least squares regression
equations for changes in the proportions of bank assets invested in diﬀer-
ent types of loans and test whether these were aﬀected by changes in classi-
ﬁed assets and CAMEL ratings. We also include dependent variables for
other changes in bank risk to determine whether any changes in supervi-
sory toughness may have aﬀected bank risk taking in other ways.
By way of preview, the data provide some statistically signiﬁcant sup-
port for all three hypotheses, as well as supporting the argument that su-
pervisory assessments aﬀect bank risk-taking behavior. However, our eval-
uation of economic signiﬁcance suggests that all of these eﬀects are likely
to be quite small. The data suggest that changes in supervisory toughness
likely do not explain much of the dramatic changes in overall bank lending
over the last decade or so.
Section 9.2 describes the supervisory process, including descriptions of
the classiﬁed assets and CAMEL ratings, and the oﬀ-site and on-site pro-
cedures used to arrive at these assessments. Section 9.3 looks at the raw
data from bank examinations, illustrating how supervisory ratings have
changed over time, and pointing out some sample selection issues. Section
9.4 brieﬂy reviews the literature on the credit crunch and other prior re-
search uses of supervisory data. Section 9.5 presents the data and method-
ology employed, section 9.6 contains results and their implications, and
section 9.7 concludes.
9.2 The Supervisory Process
Current supervisory practice based on the FDIC Improvement Act of
1991 (FDICIA) requires that banks be examined at least once every twelve
months for most banks or at least every eighteen months for some small
banks in good condition, although prior practice often resulted in signiﬁ-
cantly lower frequency (Gilbert 1993, 1994). Examination frequency is
generally higher for troubled banks—those that are perceived to be in
poor condition based on oﬀ-site monitoring of their balance sheet ratios,
past examination ratings, and so on. Supervisors also speed up the sched-
ules when there are indications of fraud, embezzlement, or other criminal
activity. Most examinations are of the full-scope type—an in-depth evalu-
ation of all areas of a bank’s operation. A limited-scope exam is less inten-
sive but reviews the same areas, whereas a targeted exam focuses on one
or two areas intensively. In most cases, banks receive advance notiﬁcation
U.S. Bank Supervisors 305so that they can have the necessary documents and information prepared.
After the on-site examination, supervisory assessments in the form of
CAMEL ratings and classiﬁed assets are determined. However, much of
the information used in the evaluation of the bank is gathered in advance
oﬀ-site. In this section, we ﬁrst describe the CAMEL ratings and classiﬁed
assets, and then discuss the oﬀ-site tasks and on-site procedures.
9.2.1 CAMEL Ratings and Classiﬁed Assets
Based on their assessments of information collected both oﬀ-site and
on-site, supervisors assign each bank a composite CAMEL rating, which
reﬂects their overall assessment of bank condition. CAMEL ratings are
integers ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 being the strongest condition and 5 be-
ing the weakest. Most banks have ratings of 1 or 2 and are considered to be
in satisfactory condition. Banks with ratings of 3, 4, or 5 are generally en-
couragedor required to take actions to improve their conditions. Table 9.1
gives more complete descriptions of the composite ratings. The CAMEL
ratings are conﬁdential, although some of the research reviewed below
suggests that the information in ratings changes becomes incorporated
into market prices.
For most of our sample, the composite CAMEL rating was based on
ﬁve components of supervisory concern—capital adequacy (C), asset qual-
ity (A), management (M), earnings (E), and liquidity (L)—each of which
also receives a rating on the 1 to 5 scale. Since 1997 supervisors have added
a component for sensitivity to market risk (S), and altered the acronym to
CAMELS. Although we do use the CAMELS rating for the end of our
data set, we continue to refer to the CAMEL acronym throughout for
convenience. Table 9.2 gives some of the details about these components.
The other main assessment made by supervisors is the determination of
classiﬁed assets. In order from highest quality to lowest quality, commer-
cial and industrial (C&I) and commercial real estate (CRE) loans are rated
as pass, special mention, substandard, doubtful, or loss. Assets in the three
most severe categories are often referred to as classiﬁed assets, although
this term is sometimes meant to include the special mention category.
Table 9.3 gives deﬁnitions of the special mention, substandard, doubtful,
and loss categories.
Examiners use the following formula to determine the minimum re-
quired level of the allocation for loan and lease losses (ALLL), which is
based on probability of default for each asset classiﬁcation:
15 50 100 %% % ∗+ ∗ + ∗
+∗ +
substandard assets   doubtful assets   loss assets
(discretionary percentage) (pass special mention),
where the discretionary percentage the bank is required to hold against
nonclassiﬁed assets is usually about 1 to 2 percent. If this minimum level
exceeds the bank’s actual reserve, the bank must add to its reserve from

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.equity capital. Thus, the greater the fraction of assets classiﬁed as substan-
dard, doubtful, or loss, and the more serious the classiﬁcation, the more
the bank may have to shift funds from equity to ALLL. This may require
the bank to reduce lending, shrink, or raise capital to comply with capi-
tal regulations.
In our empirical analysis, we use both total classiﬁed assets (substan-
dard  doubtful  loss) and weighted classiﬁed assets (15% ∗ substandard
assets  50% ∗ doubtful  100% ∗ loss). An increase in supervisory tough-
ness may occur when supervisors shift loans from pass or special mention
to substandard, doubtful, or loss, which would raise total classiﬁed assets.
Alternatively, supervisors might get tougher by shifting already-classiﬁed
assets into more serious classiﬁcations, such as from substandard to doubt-
ful or from doubtful to loss, which would raise weighted classiﬁed assets.
We include both measures of classiﬁed assets in our analysis to allow for
these possibilities.
9.2.2 Oﬀ-Site Supervisory Tasks
In general, one individual is named Examiner-in-Charge (EIC), and is
responsible for coordinating most aspects of an exam and has a number
of assistants, depending on the size and complexity of the bank. Prior to
an on-site visit, examiners perform several analyses oﬀ-site. These include
review of past examination reports and the correspondence ﬁle for that
bank, as well as its Call Report and Uniform Bank Performance Report
(UBPR). The UBPR, produced for every U.S. commercial bank by the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, summarizes several
years of Call Report data for a bank and presents both dollar amounts
and ﬁnancial ratios for most areas of bank operations. The UBPR also
includes information on the trends of these variables as well as the peer
group average for each variable and the bank’s rank within its peer group
for that variable. Peer groups are based on bank asset size, number of
oﬃces, and location in a metropolitan or nonmetropolitan area. Analysis
of the UBPR provides initial evaluations of the individual components
of the CAMEL rating (although no preliminary rating is given for the
management component), which may be changed during the on-site exam-
ination if conditions are not consistent with what was reported or expected
(Commercial Bank Examination Manual, 1020.1, p. 1). Generally, the oﬀ-
site monitoring is helpful in determining potential problems that examin-
ers should scrutinize during the on-site visit, allowing on-site resources to
be allocated more eﬃciently. Oﬀ-site monitoring is also useful for identi-
fying troubled banks or those with indications of criminal activity to speed
up the examination schedule for these institutions.
Our econometric models control for bank condition by proxying for the
information used by supervisors as well as possible. This includes forming
the levels, trends, and peer group percentile ranks of the key balance sheet
310 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scaliseand income variables speciﬁed in the UBPR from the appropriate Call
Report quarter. Failure to include these variables could bias our tests, be-
cause any change in classiﬁed assets or CAMEL ratings may reﬂect
changes in the UBPR variables, rather than changes in supervisory
harshness.
9.2.3 On-Site Examination Procedures
The most important aspect of the on-site examination is the evaluation
of the bank’s loan portfolio. This process begins with a review of the insti-
tution’s loan policies, which should include a description of the bank’s
market, targeted customers, lending guidelines, documentation, and re-
strictions or requirements on loans to insiders. Examiners also read the
minutes of the bank’s loan committee meetings, the credit department’s
procedures and ﬁles regarding the acquisition of borrower ﬁnancial infor-
mation, and internal reports on past due or problem loans.
Examiners evaluate a certain proportion of the loan portfolio, depend-
ing on the bank’s most recent composite and asset quality ratings. This
proportion ranges from 40 percent for banks with composite ratings of 1
or 2 and an asset quality rating of 1, to 60 percent or more for banks with
worse ratings or other areas of concern.
There are several steps in determining the loan sample. Examiners must
review all C&I and CRE loans that are past due, nonaccrual, restructured,
renegotiated, made to an insider, internally classiﬁed by the bank, or clas-
siﬁed at the last exam. Large loans—loans greater than a dollar cutoﬀ
determined by the EIC to be appropriate for the bank—must also be re-
viewed. This set of C&I and CRE loans is considered the core group for
review. To achieve the desired coverage of the portfolio (i.e., the 40 to 60
percent or more), additional loans are selected for review in a variety of
ways. The dollar cutoﬀ for large loans might be lowered; recent loans or
speciﬁc loan types might be selected; or random sampling or some other
technique may be applied, according to examiner discretion.
Examiners assign ratings of pass, special mention, substandard, doubt-
ful, or loss to each loan sampled. Examiners may assign distinct classiﬁca-
tions to diﬀerent parts of a loan depending on the likelihood of collection
of each particular part. Examiners may also assign split classiﬁcations,
such as substandard/doubtful, in appropriate circumstances. The loan rat-
ings are checked against the bank’s own internal ratings as a check of how
well bank management is monitoring its own portfolio. Installment loans,
residential mortgages, and other consumer credits are classiﬁed as pass,
substandard, or loss based solely on the number of days past due, not by
examiner discretion.
After the examination, the ﬁnal supervisory assessments are made. The
composite CAMEL rating is based on all the components of supervisory
U.S. Bank Supervisors 311concern—capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity,
and (more recently for the CAMELS rating) sensitivity to market risk—
and the information incorporated into the rating comes from the data gath-
ered oﬀ-site and on-site. The composite CAMEL rating is not an un-
weighted mean of these components; an examiner may use personal judg-
ment as to the importance of each component for a particular bank.
However, quality of the assets in terms of likely future losses and the ability
of the bank’s capital to absorb these losses are usually the most important
components. The composite rating is generally not supposed to be more
than one rank better than the capital (C) or asset quality (A) rank.
9.3 A Look at the Raw Data from Bank Examinations
Table 9.4 shows some summary statistics from bank examinations over
the entire 1986–98 period. Panel A shows the number of banks with exam-
ination data for each year, the mean ratios of total classiﬁed assets to loans
and weighted classiﬁed assets to loans, the mean composite CAMEL rat-
ing, and the fractions of banks receiving composite CAMEL ratings of 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5. Panel B of table 9.4 summarizes the information for the pre-
crunch, credit crunch, and boom periods. Figure 9.1 plots the fractions of
banks with the diﬀerent CAMEL ratings over time.
We include exactly one observation for each bank that was examined in
each year. Because not every bank is examined in every year, the total
number of banks examined in each year is fewer than the number of banks
in the nation. In the relatively infrequent cases in which more than one
examination was made of the same bank in the same year, we simply in-
clude the results of the ﬁnal examination of the year to avoid double count-
ing. As will be seen, changes over time in the sample of banks that were
selected by supervisors to be examined are important in interpreting the
data.
In some respects the raw data are consistent with expectations, and in
other respects the data are quite surprising. Consistent with expectations,
the supervisory assessments are unambiguously the best during the boom
period. As shown in Panel A, in each of the boom period years 1993–98,
the mean total classiﬁed asset ratio, mean weighted classiﬁed asset ratio,
mean composite CAMEL rating, and fraction of banks receivingCAMEL
ratings of 1 (the best rating) were better than the corresponding ﬁgures for
each of the credit crunch years 1989–92, and better than each of the pre-
crunch years 1986–88 as well. The data in Panel B show that on average
during the boom period, the classiﬁed asset ratios were on the order of
about half—and the fractions of banks assigned CAMEL ratings of 1 were
on the order of about double—those in the precrunch and credit crunch
periods. The ﬁgure shows a steep increase in CAMEL ratings of 1 and
steep decreases in CAMEL ratings of 3, 4, and 5 beginning in 1993. These


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32. The classiﬁed assets ﬁgures may have been held down temporarily for some banks dur-
ing the high bank failure years in the late 1980s and early 1990s in order to allow for orderly
bank closures, because high classiﬁed assets may have reduced capital to below closure levels
for too many banks at the same time.
strong improvements in supervisory assessments during the boom period
may reﬂect the improved condition of banks, any supervisory easing that
may have occurred, or a combination of the two. We try to disentangle
these eﬀects below in our multivariate empirical analysis.
Contrary to expectations, the supervisory assessments generally did not
deteriorate during the credit crunch period. As is shown in Panel A, in
each of the credit crunch years 1989–92, the mean total classiﬁed asset
ratio, mean weighted classiﬁed asset ratio, mean composite CAMEL rat-
ing, and CAMEL 1 fraction were better than the corresponding ﬁgures for
each of the precrunch years 1986–88 (although the ﬁgures for 1989 are
very close to those for 1988 and round to the same three digits for the clas-
siﬁed asset ratios). The data in Panel B show that the mean classiﬁed asset
ratios, mean composite CAMEL, and CAMEL 1 fraction for the credit
crunch period are all closer to the precrunch period ﬁgures than to the
boom period ﬁgures, indicating a much smaller improvement in the credit
crunch period than in the boom period. This slight improvement in super-
visory assessments or failure to deteriorate is surprising given both the
recession of the early 1990s and widespread belief that supervisors may
have become tougher.2
At ﬁrst blush it might seem unlikely that hypothesis 1 (increase in tough-
ness) could be supported. Banking industry conditions did improve slightly
during the credit crunch period in terms of capital ratios and problem
loans, but it would not be expected ex ante that controls for bank condition
would improve enough to oﬀset a substantial increase in supervisory
toughness. As we show next, the improvements in supervisory assessments
Fig. 9.1 CAMEL Distribution, 1986–98
314 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scaliseduring the credit crunch period may largely be an artifact of changes in
the selection of banks that were examined.
Table 9.5 illustrates the sample selection issue by comparing examined
banks with the banking industry as a whole over time. As is shown in
Panel A, the fraction of banks with examination data rises each year from
1986 to 1993 and then falls each year thereafter to 1998. The changes are
quite dramatic: The percentage of banks with recorded examinations
nearly doubles from 42.6 percent to 85.4 percent, and then drops to 62.3
percent. As is shown in Panel B of table 9.5, only 49.4 percent of banks
have examination data on average during the precrunch years, versus 69.5
percent during the credit crunch years and 75.4 percent during the boom
years. These dramatic changes in the fraction of banks examined may in
part reﬂect changes in supervisory policy, changes in regulation (such as
FDICIA, which mandates examinations every twelve or eighteen months),
or changes in bank condition.
Importantly, a change in the fraction of banks examined may change
the quality pool of the banks examined relative to the industry as a whole.
As discussed above, banks that are perceived to be in worse condition
based on oﬀ-site monitoring of their balance sheet ratios, past examination
ratings, and so on are more likely to be examined in a given year. As a
consequence, if the fraction of banks examined rises over time, one may
expect that the average quality of the pool of banks that are examined will
rise relative to the industry as a whole, as better-quality institutions are
added to the examination pool. That is, there may be no improvement or
even a deterioration in supervisory assessments on average relative to prior
examinations, but the addition of better banks to the examination pool
makes it appear from the raw data that assessments have improved. This
may help explain why the classiﬁed asset ratios and CAMEL ratings of
examined banks improved during the credit crunch period.
Additional data in table 9.5 are designed to examine this issue further.
The table shows the mean total capital ratio and mean nonperforming
loan ratio calculated from the Call Report for the year prior to the exami-
nations versus these same ratios for the industry as a whole. For the total
capital ratio, the diﬀerence between the mean for examined banks and the
mean for the industry narrows considerably during the credit crunch pe-
riod. As is shown in Panel A, the capital ratio for examined banks is 2.4
percentage points lower on average than the industry as of 1986, and this
diﬀerence narrowed to below 1 percentage point by 1990. As is shown in
Panel B, the average diﬀerence fell by about one-half from 1.9 percentage
points during the precrunch years to 0.9 percentage points during the
credit crunch years, consistent with the argument that examinations during
the credit crunch period tended to cover a higher-quality cut of the indus-
try than did examinations during the precrunch period, which may explain
the slightly improved supervisory assessments. Similar results hold for
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































03. The mean Tier 1 and leverage capital ratios for examined banks improved from 0.149
and 0.082, respectively, during the precrunch years to 0.160 and 0.087 during the credit
crunch years. For the industry, the corresponding ratios increased from 0.168 and 0.086,
respectively, to 0.170 and 0.089. Again, the percentage point diﬀerence in capital ratios be-
tween examined banks and the industry as a whole dropped by about one-half in the credit
crunch period.
4. A potential problem with the nonperforming loan data is that the deﬁnition may have
changed slightly over time due to changes in supervisory policy in which loans for which no
repayments had been missed were recorded as nonperforming. Similarly, there may have
been a change in the reported data for C&I and real estate loans, as supervisors became
more vigilant in requiring that commercial loans secured by real estate be reported as real
estate loans.
other capital ratios (not shown in the table).3 Perhaps surprisingly, there is
much less support for this argument from the nonperforming loan data;
examined banks had only slightly higher nonperforming loan ratios than
the industry as a whole during the precrunch period, and the diﬀerence
disappeared during the credit crunch period.4 Thus, the examination pool
seems to have improved substantially relative to the industry in terms of
capital, but much less so in terms of nonperforming loans.
Table 9.6 rearranges the raw data in a way that should at least partially
oﬀset the changes in sample selection over time. For each examination, we
show the changes in composite CAMEL ratings, total classiﬁed asset ratio,
and weighted classiﬁed asset ratio since the previous examination. If a
bank did not have an examination in the year or if there are no prior ex-
aminations available, the data are excluded from this table (this exclusion
is not made in our empirical analysis below). This procedure should par-
tially oﬀset the sample selection problem because each examination is
paired with exactly one prior examination of the same bank. As is shown,
there are very few observations at the start of the sample because we have
data on only a very small number of examinations prior to the start of
the precrunch period in 1986. The data are roughly consistent with the
expectations that supervisory assessments deteriorated during the credit
crunch period and improved during the boom period. As is shown in Panel
A, CAMEL downgrades exceed upgrades in the ﬁrst three years of the
credit crunch period from 1989 through 1991, and CAMEL upgrades ex-
ceed downgrades in every year from 1992 through 1997 (upgrades, down-
grades, and constant CAMEL ratings fractions sum to 1 by construction).
Similarly, the percentage of examinations with increases in classiﬁed assets
is relatively high in 1989 through 1991 and then falls oﬀ sharply in the
immediately following years (classiﬁed asset ratio decreases and increases
fractions sum to 1 by construction). The summary data in Panel B conﬁrm
this. During the credit crunch period, composite CAMEL downgrades
slightly exceed upgrades, whereas upgrades slightly exceed downgrades
during the precrunch years and upgrades greatly exceed downgrades dur-
ing the boom years. Similarly, the fractions of examinations with increases




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3in the classiﬁed asset ratios are greatest during the credit crunch years,
whereas the fractions with decreases in these ratios are highest during the
boom years. The data in table 9.6 suggest that supervisory assessments
began to be somewhat harsher just before the onset of the credit crunch
and began to be somewhat less harsh just before the onset of the banking
boom. These data are also consistent with our arguments about sample
selection. It may be that on average banks of a given quality receivedworse
supervisory assessments in the credit crunch period than in the precrunch
period, but that the average assessments improved because the increased
examination frequency resulted in a better-quality cut of the industry be-
ing examined.
There are several other sample selection issues as well. There may be
some missing observations—examinations that took place but were not on
the electronic ﬁles—particularly at the beginning of our data set. Prior to
1986, the ﬁles are very incomplete, making lagged examination data an
issue. Some of the data may also be missing for 1986 or other early years.
We also may be missing some examinations from 1998 that were not ﬁnal-
ized at the time we extracted the data set in the latter part of 1999. In
addition, some banks drop out of the sample due to mergers and failures,
and others enter the sample through the creation of new charters.
We deal with these sample selection issues in the empirical analysis in
several ways. First, we include a large number of controls for bank quality,
which may help compensate for changes over time in the quality of the cut
of the industry that is examined. Second, we include observations in the
regressions even when data for lagged supervisory assessments are missing,
and include a dummy variable ﬂagging these observations to account for
the average diﬀerence of these banks from other banks. This increases
representation for new entrants and for banks near the beginning of the
data set when examination data are sparse. Third, we try a Heckman cor-
rection for sample selection bias, although we acknowledge identiﬁcation
problems with this procedure in our case.
9.4 Literature Review
In this section, we ﬁrst brieﬂy review the literature on the causes for the
decline in bank lending during the credit crunch period. Very little of this
research has used supervisory data, despite the widespread belief that an
increase in supervisory toughness may be responsible for the reduced lend-
ing. We then review prior research that has used the supervisory data to
test the timeliness and accuracy of supervisory assessments. To our knowl-
edge there have been no prior tests of whether a decline in supervisory
toughness may have contributed to changes in bank lending behavior dur-
ing the banking boom.
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A number of hypotheses of the decline in bank credit to business during
the credit crunch period have been tested. A few studies have explicitly
investigated forms of hypotheses 1 and 3 (i.e., that supervisors got tougher
andthatthistoughnessreducedbusinesslending).Inthestudyclosestinap-
proach to the current paper, Bizer (1993) ran ordered logit equations for
composite CAMEL ratings on a limited number of Call Report items, re-
gionaldummies,andprimarysupervisordummies.Hefoundthatthemodel
predicted tougher CAMEL ratings during the quarters of the credit crunch
period than in a single-quarter control period of 1988:4. He also regressed
lending on lagged CAMEL ratings and a few control variables and found
that worse CAMEL ratings were associated with reduced lending.
Although this was an excellent early attempt, in our opinion a more
comprehensive approach is needed. As we discussed earlier, it is important
to control for as much of the information used in the supervisory process
at the time of the ratings assignment as possible, including the levels,
trends, and peer group percentile ranks of the key balance sheet and in-
come variables explicitly used to form the CAMEL ratings. Bizer’s
CAMEL equations include very few of the speciﬁed levels, and none of
the trends or peer group percentile ranks. For example, he excluded the
risk-based capital ratios, so the eﬀects of enforcing these regulatory re-
quirements through the supervisory process may not be captured. Similar
criticisms also apply to the lending regressions, which do not control for
problem loan categories. As is indicated later, our strongest results for the
lending equations are generated by changes in classiﬁed assets, which are
excluded from Bizer’s analysis. We also include much more information
about the condition of banks in the same state and use a three-year pre-
crunch base period in place of a single quarter.
Another study that used supervisory assessments was Peek and Rosen-
gren (1995a). These authors tested a form of hypothesis 3 by evaluating
the eﬀects of supervisory enforcement actions in New England during the
credit crunch period. They found that banks under enforcement actions
reduced lending more than other banks in the same region with the same
capital-to-asset ratios, supporting the hypothesis that supervisory actions
contributed to the reduction in lending. Again, the conclusions may be
somewhat limited because there were very few control variables speciﬁed
for bank condition, making it diﬃcult to disentangle supervisory actions
from the eﬀects of the condition of the banks’ portfolios.
A number of studies tested whether implementation of tougher capital
standards contributed to the decline in U.S. bank lending to business dur-
ing the credit crunch period. Some tested the eﬀects of implementation of
the Basel Accord risk-based capital standards (e.g., Haubrich and Wachtel
1993; Berger and Udell 1994; Hancock and Wilcox 1994a; Wagster 1999).
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plicit or implicit regulatory capital standards based on leverage ratios (e.g.,
Berger and Udell 1994; Peek and Rosengren 1994, 1995b; Hancock and
Wilcox 1994a; Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox 1995; Shrieves and Dahl
1995). Although there is not full consensus, the empirical results generally
do not support risk-based capital as a major contributor to the lending
slowdown, but do provide some support for the eﬀects of tougher explicit
or implicit leverage capital requirements.
As noted previously, to the extent that capital requirements or other
regulatory changes are enforced through the supervisory process by as-
signing worse CAMEL ratings for the same capital ratio and other balance
sheet and income ratios, they may be captured in our tests of supervisory
toughness below. That is, if supervisors enforce higher capital ratios, then
there should be a worse CAMEL rating assigned for the same capital ratio,
all else equal. In our empirical analysis, we include the Tier 1 and total
risk-based capital ratios as well as the leverage ratio to capture these ef-
fects, although identifying these individual capital eﬀects is quite diﬃcult
and is not a goal of this paper.
A notable advantage of our tests is that by including actual supervisory
assessments, we can better distinguish between supervisory-induced
changes in bank behavior and voluntary changes in bank behavior. It is
possible that a reduction in lending during the credit crunch period by
banks with capital below the regulatory minimums represents a voluntary
retrenchment of risks by banks, rather than the eﬀects of changes in regu-
lation or supervision. Similarly, some studies found that during the credit
crunch period, banks facing greater portfolio risks—such as those with
more nonperforming loans or those in nations with more banking system
risk—also tended to cut back their lending more than other banks (e.g.,
Berger and Udell 1994; Wagster 1999). Without supervisory information,
it is not possible to distinguish whether this represents supervisory or vol-
untary reactions to risk. Our tests, which control for measures of portfolio
risks, may help distinguish among these alternatives.
Other studies tested whether demand or supply factors other than regu-
latory/supervisory changes contributed signiﬁcantly to the change in lend-
ing during the credit crunch period. Tests have been performed of the
eﬀects of the depletion of bank capital from loan loss experiences of the
late 1980s (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 1994, 1995b; Hancock and Wilcox
1994a, 1997, 1998), potential choices of lower risk proﬁles by bank man-
agers (e.g., Hancock and Wilcox 1993, 1994b), reduced loan demand be-
cause of macroeconomic or regional recessions (e.g., Bernanke and Lown
1991; Hancock and Wilcox 1993, 1997), or a secular decline in the demand
for bank loans because of the growth of alternative sources of credit (e.g.,
Berger and Udell 1994). All of these hypotheses were supported to at least
some degree.
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Previous research on bank examinations or bank holding company
(BHC) inspections has usually focused on either the timeliness or accuracy
of supervisory assessments of banking organization condition measured
relative to market assessments. Studies of timeliness generally tested
whether changes in supervisory assessments (changes in CAMEL; changes
in BOPEC, the corresponding rating for bank holding companies; or iden-
tiﬁcation of problem banks) occurred before or after changes in market
assessments of banking problems (equity or debt price changes, changes
in bond ratings, or changes in share ownership by institutions or insiders).
Most of the early studies of timeliness found that supervisors did not
have information in a more timely fashion than market participants. Pett-
way (1980) performed even studies for six large banks that were placed
on the problem bank list during 1972–76 and found signiﬁcantly negative
cumulative abnormal stock returns before the examination that ﬁrst recog-
nized the banks’ problems, suggesting a timeliness advantage for investors
over supervisors. Hirschhorn (1987) investigated whether CAMEL rating
changes predate stock price changes, using data on examination ratings of
the lead banks of the ﬁfteen largest BHCs during 1978–87. He found that
CAMEL ratings were approximately contemporaneously correlated with
abnormal returns, suggesting that supervisors generally had little if any
economically signiﬁcant informational advantage over equity market par-
ticipants. Cargill (1989) examined cross-sectional variation in the rates on
large certiﬁcates of deposit for ﬁfty-eight large banks during 1984–86. He
found that CAMEL ratings added no signiﬁcant explanatory power be-
yond Call Report ﬁnancial ratios, again implying that supervisors did not
have substantial information prior to market participants.
In contrast, more recent studies generally found that supervisors did
have some valuable information on a more timely basis than market parti-
cipants. Simons and Cross (1991) identiﬁed twenty-two BHCs whose lead
banks had their composite CAMEL rating lowered to the problem ratings
of 4 or 5 during 1981–87. They found that the company’s weekly abnormal
stock returns for the year preceding the downgrade were equally likely to
be positive or negative, and that few news stories chronicled the ﬁrms’
problems, suggesting that supervisors may have known about problems
before market participants. Berger and Davies (1998) used event study
methodology to identify abnormal BHC stock returns after 390 lead bank
examinations during 1985–89. They separated out the three types of infor-
mation that may be generated by the examination: private information
about bank condition, certiﬁcation information about the quality of
audited ﬁnancial statements, and supervisory discipline information about
whether the bank may have greater or fewer restrictions placed on it. They
322 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scalise5. Consistent with this conclusion, Hall, Meyer, and Vaughan (1997) found that supervi-
sors and shareholders responded diﬀerently to balance sheet measures of BHC condition.
6. Studies of bank “early warning” systems (e.g., Sinkey 1978; Whalen and Thompson
1988; O’Keefe and Dahl 1997) tested how well supervisory ratings can be predicted from
publicly available information, generally Call Report data. These may be viewed as tests of
whether supervisors have information not already in the publicly available data, although
this was not the main purpose. These studies generally found that the supervisory ratings
were far from perfectly predictable from Call Report information, consistent with the super-
visors adding timely information. However, these studies are less useful for evaluating timeli-
ness than are studies using stock and bond market data, because market data presumably
incorporate much more information than the Call Report.
found that the only type of private information that was transferred to the
market was unfavorable private information about bank condition, sug-
gesting that supervisors force the release of unfavorable information. Jor-
dan (1999) found results consistent with these when investigating the
eﬀects of examinations of banks in thirty-ﬁve BHCs in New England over
the period 1988:1–1990:3. He found statistically signiﬁcant negative ab-
normal stock returns (below the mean returns of these thirty-ﬁve BHCs)
in the quarter after CAMEL downgrades involving at least one-third of
the BHCs banking assets, but no signiﬁcant change in market prices for
examinations overall. DeYoung et al. (forthcoming) investigated whether
national bank examiners’ private information signiﬁcantly predicted
changes in the risk premiums on large BHCs subordinated debentures dur-
ing 1989–95. They found that debenture yield spreads changed after the
examination information, suggesting that examiners uncover relevant in-
formation before the market. Consistent with Berger and Davies (1998),
this predictive eﬀect occurred only for negative supervisory assessments.
Flannery and Houston (1999) evaluated the correspondence between mar-
ket and book valuations for a sample of BHCs in the fourth quarters of
1988 and 1990 and found that investors evaluated ﬁnancial information
diﬀerently when the BHC had recently received an on-site inspection, par-
ticularly in the relatively normal 1988 period. Inspected BHCs showed a
closer correspondence between market and book values, consistent with
the hypothesis that investors view examiners as credibly certifying of the
ﬁnancial statements’ accuracy. Finally, Berger, Davies, and Flannery
(2000) used quarterly data from inspections of 184 large BHCs over the
period 1989:4–1992:2 and found that BHC supervisors and bond rating
agencies both have some timely prior information that is useful to the
other. However, supervisory assessments and equity market indicators
were not strongly related to each other, presumably because of diﬀerences
in incentives regarding risks and expected returns.5,6
Studies of supervisory accuracy generally tested whether changes in su-
pervisory assessments added to the predictions of changes in bank condi-
tion (e.g., bank failure, book-value insolvency, changes in nonperforming
U.S. Bank Supervisors 323loans or equity capital) or macroeconomic performance beyond other
public or private sources of information (e.g., market assessments, Call
Report information, or Federal Reserve staﬀ forecasts). This literature
found mixed results. Davies (1993) tested whether CAMEL or BOPEC
ratings versus market/book ratios better helped predict future book-value
insolvency (bank’s capital ratio below either 2 percent or 3 percent of
assets) during 1986–91 and found that unsatisfactory bank CAMEL rat-
ings helped predict a higher probability of book-value insolvency, but that
unsatisfactory holding company BOPEC ratings had little or no additional
predictive power. Cole and Gunther (1998) compared supervisory ratings
with Call Report information in predicting future bank failures during
1988:2–1992:1 and found that CAMEL ratings improved forecast accu-
racy, but only if the examination was in the most recent two quarters.
Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) similarly found that supervisory as-
sessments are much less accurate overall than both bond and equity mar-
ket assessments in predicting future changes in performance, but that su-
pervisors may be more accurate when inspections are recent. Finally, Peek,
Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a,b) used quarterly data from 1978:1–1996:2
and 1978:1–1994:4, respectively, and found that the proportion of the na-
tion’s banking assets in banks with composite CAMEL ratings of 5 (the
worst rating) added information in predicting macroeconomic perfor-
mance beyond what was incorporated in the predictions of private-sector
forecasting ﬁrms and Federal Reserve staﬀ.
A fundamental problem with tests of supervisory accuracy is that accu-
racy in predicting future performance may not be the primary goal of
supervisors. Supervisors may be more concerned with accurately describ-
ing the current condition of a BHC in order to exert pressure on institu-
tions to resolve problems, and be less concerned with predicting future
condition. Supervisors may be very accurate in assessing current condition
while appearing to be very inaccurate at predicting future condition, par-
ticularly if supervisors are successful at pressuring institutions to resolve
problems. For example, a CAMEL downgrade or an increase in classiﬁed
assets may encourage an institution to stop making risky loans, eventually
reducing its nonperforming loan ratio. The ﬁnding in Cole and Gunther
(1998) and Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) that supervisors may be
more accurate than market participants in predicting short-run future per-
formance and less accurate than market participants in predicting long-
run future performance is consistent with this argument, because any
change in problem loans caused by supervisory pressure is likely to take
several quarters to appear in full in the data. Because of these diﬃculties,
we do not try to determine whether any increase or decrease in supervisory
toughness in the data represents a change in accuracy.
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of its error term [{(1/class)  [1/(1class)]}/total loans]1/2.
9.5 Methodology and Data
9.5.1 Tests of Changes in Supervisory Harshness (Hypotheses 1 and 2)
To test for changes in supervisory toughness, we model two types of
supervisory assessments—classiﬁed assets and composite CAMEL rat-
ings—as functions of measures of bank ﬁnancial condition and other fac-
tors representing the economic environment of the bank. The econometric
models mimic as closely as possible the information used in the supervi-
sory process at the time of the supervisory assessments. Of course, it is not
possible to include all of the information available to supervisors at the
time they set the classiﬁed assets and CAMEL ratings, but we address this
issue as well as we can by (a) including the key balance sheet and income
variables speciﬁed in the supervisory procedures in their level, trend, and
peer group percentile ranks, as discussed earlier; (b) including a large num-
ber of other control variables for bank condition and economic environ-
ment; (c) bracketing the information set used by supervisors by running
the models with and without information on the future performance of the
bank, which is more information than the supervisors could have access
to at the time of the supervisory assessments; and (d) running large num-
bers of robustness checks on the models.
The classiﬁed assets model takes the form
ln[class/(1 class)] [time dummies, lagged supervisory assessments,
supervisory agency dummies, bank size, bank
balance sheet and income items, state averages




These variables are shown in table 9.7. There are between 190 and 199
coeﬃcients estimated in each classiﬁed assets equations, depending on
whether the future performance variables (described later) are included.
The dependent variable is in log-odds form, the natural log of the pro-
portion of loans that are classiﬁed divided by one minus this proportion.
The equation may be interpreted as a log-odds grouped logit model for the
probability that a dollar of loans will be classiﬁe d .I ti se s t i m a t e db y
weighted least squares in order to avoid heteroscedasticity problems and
the adjusted R2s are corrected.7 As is shown in table 9.7, we specify models
for both total classiﬁed assets and weighted classiﬁed assets.
The time dummies are also speciﬁed in diﬀerent ways to ensure ro-
bustness of the results. In some equations, we include dummies for each
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Assessment Regressions
Name Deﬁnition Mean Std. Dev.
Supervisory Assessments of Bank Condition
Total classiﬁed assets Proportion of loans classiﬁed as .060 .065
substandard, doubtful, or loss.
Weighted classiﬁed assets Weighted proportion of loans .015 .020
classiﬁed, weights of .2 on
substandard, .5 on doubtful, and
1o nl o s s .
CAMEL 1 Dummy variable equal to 1 if .275 .447
CAMEL rating is 1.
CAMEL 2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if .521 .500
CAMEL rating is 2.
CAMEL 3 Dummy variable equal to 1 if .128 .334
CAMEL rating is 3.
CAMEL 4 or 5 Dummy variable equal to 1 if .075 .264
CAMEL rating is 4 or 5
(combined because there were
so few 5s).
CAMEL satisfactory Dummy variable equal to 1 if .797 .403
CAMEL rating is 1 or 2.
CAMEL unsatisfactory Dummy variable equal to 1 if .203 .143
CAMEL rating is 3, 4, or 5.
Time dummies
1986–88 Precrunch period. This is excluded .216 .412
as the base period in the main
regressions.
1989–92 Credit crunch period. .370 .483
1993–98 Banking boom period. .414 .493
Individual year dummies Included in some regressions.
Lagged Supervisory Assessments
Lagged total classiﬁed Lagged values of supervisory
assets, weighted assessments for banks with prior
classiﬁed assets, examination data, set to zero
CAMEL 1, CAMEL otherwise (see no lagged
2, CAMEL 3 examination data variable).
Time since last recorded Years since last recorded .994 .701
examination examination, set to zero if no
prior data (see no lagged
examination data variable).
No lagged examination Dummy variable equal to 1 if no .106 .308
data lagged examination data are
available.
Supervisory Agency
OCC Dummy variable equal to 1 if the .248 .432
OCC was the lead agency in the
exam.
FDIC Dummy variable equal to 1 if the .366 .482
FDIC was the lead agency in
the exam.
FRB Dummy variable equal to 1 if the .078 .268
FRB was the lead agency in the
exam.STATE Dummy variable equal to 1 if state .308 .461
agency or other federal agency.
This is excluded as the base
case.
Bank Size variables
ln(GTA) Natural log of gross total assets. 11.039 1.221
SIZE1 Dummy variable equal to 1 if .723 .448
GTA 
 $100 million (excluded
from regressions as base case).
SIZE 2 Dummy variable equal to 1 if $100 .245 .430
million  GTA 
 $1 billion.
SIZE 3 Dummy variable equal to 1 if $1 .028 .164
billion  GTA 
 $10 billion.
SIZE 4 Dummy variable equal to 1 if $10 .004 .065
billion  GTA.
Bank Balance Sheet and Income Items
Total capital ratio, Tier 1 capital




loans, other real estate owned/
total loans, return on assets, and
volatile liability dependence. All
are lagged and all are included
as level, trend, and peer group
percentile rank.
State Averages of Balance Sheet and Income Items
State averages of the same
variables as the bank balance
sheet and income items. These
variables are also lagged and all
are included as level, trend, and
peer group percentile rank.
Other Economic Environment Indicators




Future nonperforming Leads of 1, 2, and 3 years included .038 .036
loans in regressions. Mean for lead 1
shown.
Future charge-oﬀs Leads of 1, 2, and 3 years included .005 .035
in regressions. Mean for lead 1
shown.
Future total capital ratio Leads of 1, 2, and 3 years included .169 .078
in regressions. Mean for lead 1
shown.
Table 9.7 (continued)
Name Deﬁnition Mean Std. Dev.of our three main time periods: precrunch (1986–88), credit crunch (1989–
92), and boom (1993–98). In other equations, we specify dummies for each
individual year to allow the data more freedom to “choose for themselves”
when changes in supervisory toughness occurred. We use the coeﬃcients
of the time dummies to establish the changes in supervisory toughness.
That is, after controlling as well as we can for the supervisors’ information
in the rest of the equation, we test the coeﬃcients of these dummies to see
if classiﬁed assets tend to be higher in the credit crunch period as predicted
by hypothesis 1, and lower during the boom period, as predicted by hy-
pothesis 2.
We also include lagged supervisory assessments to account for stickiness
in assessments or additional information inherent in past assessments. We
include the lagged total classiﬁed assets ratio in the total classiﬁed assets
regressions and the lagged weighted classiﬁed assets ratio in the weighted
classiﬁed assets equation. In both models we include lagged dummy vari-
ables for the last previously recorded composite CAMEL rating (lagged
CAMEL 4 or 5 is excluded as the base case). The time since last recorded
examination may help predict supervisory outcomes because problem
banks are typically examined more frequently, although a shorter lag may
also predict less change in condition, because there is less time for changes
in condition to occur. Importantly, we also include data for banks without
previous examination records to avoid sample selection problems as dis-
cussed earlier. For these observations, we set the dummy for “No lagged
examination data” to 1 and set the values of the other lagged supervisory
assessment variables to zero. In eﬀect, we account for the average diﬀer-
ence of these banks from other banks.
We also include supervisory agency dummies to account for the possi-
bility of systematic diﬀerences in supervisory standards across government
a g e n c i e s .T h e ym a ya l s or e ﬂect systematic diﬀerences in the quality of
banks with diﬀerent charter types or Federal Reserve membership for
which we do not otherwise adequately control.
The bank size variables include a continuous measure of bank assets, as
well as dummies for diﬀerent size classes. These control for many diﬀer-
ences between large and small banks that may not be otherwise controlled
for in the model, including the degree of industrial and geographic diversi-
ﬁcation in the loan portfolio, risks from oﬀ-balance sheet or international
exposures, and any systematic diﬀerences in supervisory treatment.
The bank balance sheet and income items are the levels, trends, and peer
group percentile ranks of the nine key balance sheet and income variables
speciﬁed in the UBPR and taken from the appropriate Call Report quar-
ter. These are the total capital ratio, Tier 1 capital ratio, leverage capital
ratio, real estate loans/total loans, nonperforming loans/total loans, oﬀ-
balance sheet items/total loans, other real estate owned/total loans, return
328 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scalise8. Interstate bank branching was essentially prohibited prior to the implementation of the
Riegle-Neal Banking and Branching Eﬃciency Act in 1997. BHCs were permitted to own
banks in diﬀerent states prior to this time, but our data are on the individual banks, not their
holding companies.
on assets, and volatile liability dependence. All of these variables are speci-
ﬁed in both ﬁrst- and second-order terms and interactions, so that each
actually appears nine times in the regressor list to allow for a very ﬂexible
functional form. That is, for i  1 ,...,9 ,w es p e c i f yxit,( xit  xit1),
xrankit,( xit)2,( xit  xit1)2,( xrankit)2, xit  (xit  xit1), xit  xrankit,a n d
(xit  xit1)  xrankit, where xit represents the current value of the variable
computed from the Call Report; (xit  xit1) is the trend; and xrankit is
the current peer group percentile rank, for a total of eighty-one variables
speciﬁed (means, standard deviations, and coeﬃcients not shown in
tables).
We also include a number of controls for the economic environment of
the bank. The state averages of balance sheet and income items are the
same eighty-one variables as are speciﬁed for the bank itself, except that
they are state averages to help control for the economic environment of the
bank (data not shown in tables). Other economic environment indicators
include regional dummies for the Federal Reserve District (which may
capture systematic diﬀerences in regional economic conditions or supervi-
sory treatment) as well as state income growth and unemployment rate.
Although the local economic environment is not explicitly speciﬁed in the
examination procedures, it is nonetheless important to control for the envi-
ronment to account for exogenous changes in bank condition that may be
reﬂected in supervisory assessments. For example, supervisors may be
more likely to ﬁnd problems in the loan portfolio and assign more classi-
ﬁed assets and a worse CAMEL rating for a bank in a state with low
income growth, a high unemployment rate, and poor state-average bank
balance sheet and income items, even after taking into account the bank’s
own balance sheet and income items. To the extent that there are changes
in the macroeconomic or regional environment that aﬀect all banks in the
nation or region, these eﬀects may be mostly captured by these state-level
variables, because banks were generally legally restricted to have full-
service banking oﬃces only in their home state for almost all of our
sample.8 That is, conditions outside the home state are likely to be much
less important than those in the state.
Finally, we alternately exclude and include the future performance vari-
ables, which are leads of one, two, and three years of nonperforming loans,
charge-oﬀs, and the total risk-based capital ratio. As noted earlier, it is not
possible to include all of the information available to supervisors at the
time of the supervisory assessments, although the variables reviewed thus
U.S. Bank Supervisors 329far represent our best attempt. One of the ways we attack this problem is
to include these future values of nonperforming loans, charge-oﬀs, and
capital, which capture more information than the supervisors could have
had access to at the time of the assessments and represent fairly well the
future condition of the bank that supervisors are interested in predicting
or altering. In eﬀect, we try to bracket the information set used by super-
visors by running the models alternately with less information and with
more information than supervisors have. If the same qualitative result
for changes in supervisory toughness holds when we specify both less and
more information than supervisors have, then we will feel more conﬁdent
in drawing conclusions about what occurred with their actual (unob-
served) information set. We recognize that the future performance vari-
ables are endogenous, that their coeﬃcients are unreliable, and that the
model is underidentiﬁed with their inclusion; but our purpose is to check
the robustness of the main model, which excludes these variables, rather
than to rely on equations with the endogenous variables. Fortunately, the
results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the future performance
variables, supporting our interpretation of the time dummies as reﬂecting
changes in supervisory toughness, rather than important excluded vari-
ables.
We also run the classiﬁed asset model (as well as the CAMEL model
below) using a Heckman correction to deal with potential sample selection
problems. We ﬁrst run a probit equation for the probability that a bank
has an exam in a given year, and then include the resulting inverse Mills
ratio as a regressor in the equations for the classiﬁed asset ratios and
CAMEL ratings. We specify a separate probit model for each year to take
account of the apparent signiﬁcant changes over time in the probability of
an examination. The variables in these models include the same past values
of key balance sheet and income variables, past supervisory ratings, and
so on, which should aﬀect the decision to examine a bank, just as they
aﬀect the supervisory rating on a bank. This creates a problem of identiﬁ-
cation for the Heckman correction, because we have no variables in the
ﬁrst stage for the probability of an examination that are not also in the
second stage for the supervisory assessments at the examinations. Because
we do not have any “true” exclusion restrictions, our sample selection cor-
rection is identiﬁed by (a) the fact that we run separate probit equations
for each year, letting all the coeﬃcients vary to take account of changes
over time in the probability of an examination, and (b) the nonlinearity
inherent in the inverse Mills ratio. The use of the same underlying variables
cannot be helped, because all of the variables that supervisors use in oﬀ-
site monitoring in selecting banks to be examined are also used in their
determination of the supervisory assessments at the end of the examina-
tion. Fortunately, our main results regarding hypotheses 1 and 2 are robust
to including or excluding the Heckman correction.
330 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scalise9. As a robustness check, we try running the model with the management (M) component
of the CAMEL rating in place of the composite rating, because the supervisors have a sig-
niﬁcant amount of discretion in assigning a management rating, with results very similar to
those for the composite CAMEL. We also rerun the composite CAMEL model as a binomial
logit for the probability of a satisfactory rating (1 or 2) versus an unsatisfactory rating (3, 4,
or 5).
The model for the composite CAMEL ratings is very similar and takes
the form
Probability(CAMEL) [time dummies, lagged supervisory 
assessments, supervisory agency dummies, 
bank size, bank balance sheet and income items, 
state averages of balance sheet and income items, 
economic environment indicators,
(classified assets), (future performance)].
= g
This equation is speciﬁed as an ordered logit of the choice among com-
posite CAMEL 1, 2, 3, and (4 or 5). As is indicated in table 9.7, CAMEL
5 is grouped with CAMEL 4 because CAMEL 5 is so rare.9
The regressors speciﬁed are identical to those in the classiﬁed assets
model with one exception. We run the CAMEL model three ways: with
current total classiﬁed assets included as a regressor, with current weighted
classiﬁed assets included, and with no current classiﬁed assets included.
The purposes are to allow the data to describe diﬀerent types of changes
in supervisory toughness and to check robustness of the results. One way
that changes in supervisory toughness may aﬀect CAMEL ratings is that
supervisors may simply assign a higher or lower composite CAMEL grade
after an on-site examination for a given evaluation of the loan portfolio,
which may be described by the model with current classiﬁed assets speci-
ﬁed in total or weighted form. That is, supervisors may take as given the
set of classiﬁcations for the loan portfolio and assign a harsher or laxer rat-
ing. Alternatively, supervisors may assign a harsher or laxer CAMEL rat-
ing as part of the same process in which loans are classiﬁed more or less
harshly.Inthiscase,thespeciﬁcationwithnocurrentclassiﬁedassetsspeci-
ﬁedis correct. Fortunately, the results are robust to the inclusion or exclu-
sion of the current classiﬁed assets variables as regressors.
9.5.2 Tests of Changes in Supervisory Toughness
on Bank Lending Behavior (Hypothesis 3)
To test for the eﬀects of changes in supervisory toughness on bank lend-
ing behavior, we model changes in bank lending and other measures of
performance as functions of three years of past changes in supervisory
assessments and include control variables for three years of other past
changes in bank condition and economic environment. Three years of
U.S. Bank Supervisors 331lagged changes are included because it may take a considerable amount of
time for a bank to change the composition of its loan portfolio.












performance time dummies,  supervisory assessments
(3 years of lags),  bank balance sheet and income 
items (3 years of lags),  state averages of balance
sheet and income items (3 years of lags),  state
averages of supervisory assessments (3 years of lags),
other economic environment indicators
(3 years of lags)].
= h[
The 
performance variables include two types of variables: (a) direct
measures of the changes in lending behavior and (b) measures of changes
in bank risk. The direct measures of changes in lending behavior are the
one-year changes in the ratios of C&I loans, real estate loans, installment
loans, and U.S. Treasuries to gross total assets (e.g., C&It/GTAt  C&It1/
GTAt1) as well as the proportional change in gross total assets ([GTAt 
GTAt1]/GTAt1). We test whether CAMEL downgrades and increases in
classiﬁed assets predict reductions in lending and assets and increases in
Treasuries, and vice versa for CAMEL upgrades and decreases in classi-
ﬁed assets.
The measures of changes in bank risk included as 
performance depen-
dent variables are the ratios of nonperforming loans and charge-oﬀst o
gross total assets and the total capital ratio (essentially, changes in the
same variables alternately included and excluded in the supervisory assess-
ment regressions above). The predicted signs on supervisory toughness in
these regressions could go either way, depending on the extent to which a
supervisory downgrade encourages banks to reduce risks versus the extent
to which it accurately predicts declining future performance. This tension
between supervisory assessments as intended to change behavior versus to
predict outcomes is diﬃcult to disentangle, as was indicated in the litera-
ture review. The results of these regressions should yield some interesting
information on the net eﬀect of these opposing forces, but we do not view
the results of the changes in bank risk regressions as clean tests of hypothe-
sis 3, that supervisory changes alter bank lending behavior.
The regressors included in the 
performance model diﬀer in a number
of ways from those in the supervisory assessment equations. For the time
dummies, we include the year dummies, rather than the period dummies,
to allow maximum ﬂexibility, because these variables are not the main fo-
cus of attention here. Data for the year 1986 are dropped, and the dummy
for 1987 is the base case, because the data did not go back far enough to
cover the lags needed for 1986. The remaining variables are measured as
three years of lagged changes to allow time for the bank to adjust its port-
folio in reaction to the changes in supervisory assessments and other
332 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scalisechanges in bank condition and environment. As additional variables, we
include state averages of changes in classiﬁed assets and CAMEL ratings.
We exclude peer group percentile ranks of the balance sheet and income
items because these variables should primarily inﬂuence supervisors,
rather than bank managers.
In the speciﬁcation of the 
supervisory assessments variables, we spec-
ify three lags of dummies for CAMEL upgrades and downgrades, leaving
“no change” as the base case. This allows for an asymmetric response of
banks to upgrades and downgrades. We show the results with three lags
of changes in total classiﬁed assets, but the results were robust to alter-
nately using weighted classiﬁed assets. Classiﬁed assets are measured here
as proportions of assets, rather than as proportions of loans as in the su-
pervisory regressions, in order to form a better indicator of the supervisory
pressure on banks to change their behavior.
9.6 Empirical Results
9.6.1 Results of Tests of Changes in Supervisory Harshness
(Hypotheses 1 and 2)
Table 9.8 presents the weighted least squares regression equations for
classiﬁed asset ratios and ordered logit regressions for the composite
CAMEL rating. These models include dummies for the main time periods,
the credit crunch (1989–92), and boom (1993–98) periods, with the pre-
crunch (1986–88) period excluded as the base case. Other models that
include dummies for each individual year yield similar results but are not
shown in the tables. We also do not show the coeﬃcients for most of the
control variables to save space. As indicated previously, there are nearly
200 coeﬃcients estimated in each supervisory equation. The two asterisks
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level, two-sided.
To test hypothesis 1, that supervisors got tougher on banks during the
credit crunch period, we test the coeﬃcients of the time dummies to see if
classiﬁed assets tend to be higher and composite CAMEL ratings tend to
be worse in the credit crunch period than in the precrunch period after
controlling as well as we can for the supervisors’ information in the equa-
tions. The coeﬃcients of the credit crunch dummy (1989–92) in the total
classiﬁed assets equations in table 9.8 are positive, but small and statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant. For the weighted classiﬁed assets equations, the coeﬃ-
cients of the credit crunch dummy are larger and statistically signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings hold whether or not the future performance variables (leads
of one, two, and three years of nonperforming loans, charge-oﬀs, and total
capital) are included in the estimation (observations from the ﬁnal three
years of the sample are dropped when the future performance variables
are included).































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.10. Letting P1 be the new probability of a dollar of loans being classiﬁed, the formula for
the ﬁgure in the text is given by ln[P1/(1  P1)]  ln[.072/(1  .072)]  .005211.
To evaluate whether these results are economically signiﬁcant, we evalu-
ate the contributions of the credit crunch dummy to the probability that a
dollar of loans is classiﬁed. The dependent variable is in log-odds logistic
form [ln(class/(1  class))], and may be interpreted as a probability model,
as discussed earlier. Because the equation is nonlinear, the measured eﬀect
will depend on the point of evaluation. We choose the means of total and
weighted classiﬁed asset proportions during the credit crunch as the most
relevant points of evaluation, .072 and .018, respectively (see table 9.4,
Panel B). Increasing the dependent variable of the total classiﬁed assets
equation by .005211 (the coeﬃcient on the credit crunch dummy) increases
the predicted proportion of classiﬁed loans from 7.2 percent to 7.235 per-
cent, an economically small eﬀect.10 Similarly, increasing the dependent
variable of the weighted classiﬁed assets equation by .046267 increases the
predicted weighted classiﬁed proportion from 1.8 percent to 1.884 percent,
which is larger, but would still appear to be a small economic inﬂuence.
Thus, the data suggest at most a relatively modest eﬀect of examiners get-
ting tougher during the credit crunch period in terms of requiring that
banks of a given condition classify more loans or shift loans into more
serious classiﬁcations. The economic signiﬁcance results are consistent
with on the order of magnitude of about 1 percent or less of the loan port-
folio being additionally classiﬁed or classiﬁed more seriously.
We turn next to the measured eﬀects on the composite CAMEL rating.
The negative, statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the dummy for the
period of 1989–92 indicate that the probability of receiving a favorable
CAMEL rating is lower than during the precrunch period, all else held
equal. Again, the eﬀects are comparable, whether or not the future perfor-
mance variables are included. The models shown in table 9.8 control for
the current level of total classiﬁed assets, but the results are robust with re-
specttousingcurrentweightedclassiﬁedassetsortoexcludingcurrentclas-
siﬁed assets altogether.
To evaluate the economic signiﬁcance of the CAMEL results, we com-
pare the predicted values of CAMEL 1, CAMEL 2, CAMEL 3, and
CAMEL 4 or 5 with and without the coeﬃcient of the credit crunch
dummy variable. That is, we evaluate the predicted CAMEL ratings as if
the coeﬃcients reﬂect the precrunch supervisory regime versus the credit
crunch supervisory regime. The point of evaluation is the median of all
the variables for the credit crunch period except that the dummy variables
are set to one or zero. We assume that the lagged CAMEL rating is a 2
(the modal rating), the region is 1 (New England), the size class is 1 (assets
below $100 million), and that the bank was examined by a state super-
visory agency. The predicted percentages of CAMEL 1, CAMEL 2,
336 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scalise11. We also rerun the CAMEL model as a binomial logit for the probability of a satisfac-
tory rating (1 or 2) versus an unsatisfactory rating (3, 4, or 5; not shown in tables). The results
again show a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the credit crunch dummy variable. The results
were also more economically signiﬁcant than the full model; the data suggest that for a given
bank condition at the mean of the data set, the probability of a satisfactory rating decreased
about 9 percentage points (from 74.2 to 65.0 percent). The diﬀerence from our main result
may be due in part to the sparser speciﬁcation of the satisfactory versus unsatisfactory rating,
a n di np a r tt ot h ed i ﬀerent point of evaluation.
CAMEL 3, and CAMEL 4 or 5 are 9.37 percent, 88.91 percent, 1.70 per-
cent, and 0.001 percent, respectively, without the credit crunch dummy
coeﬃcient, and 6.89 percent, 90.74 percent, 2.36 percent, and 0.002 per-
cent, respectively, with the credit crunch dummy coeﬃcient. These results
suggest that CAMEL ratings are relatively “sticky”: Banks rated as
CAMEL 2 in the prior examination are about 90 percent likely to receive
a 2 during the next examination. These results are consistent with only a
modest increase in supervisory harshness during the credit crunch period,
worsening the CAMEL ratings for about 3 percent of banks.11
To test hypothesis 2, that supervisors got easier on banks during the
boom period, we use the same models and test the coeﬃcients of the time
dummies to see if classiﬁed assets tend to be lower and CAMEL ratings
tend to be more favorable in the boom period for a given bank condition
and economic environment. The coeﬃcients of the boom period dummy
(1993–98) in the classiﬁed assets equations in table 9.8 are negative, larger
in absolute value than the credit crunch period dummies, and statistically
signiﬁcant in all four cases, consistent with a reduction in supervisory
toughness during the boom period. These results are robust to the speciﬁ-
cation of total or weighted classiﬁed assets and to whether or not the future
performance variables are included.
To assess the economic signiﬁcance of the classiﬁed asset results for the
boom period, we evaluate the contribution to the probability that dollar
of loans is classiﬁed of the boom period dummy minus the credit crunch
dummy, which measures the change between these two periods. We evalu-
ate at the mean proportions of total and weighted classiﬁed assets during
the boom period, .039 and .009, respectively (see table 9.4). Changing the
dependent variable of the total classiﬁed assets equation by (.16131 
.005211; the boom period dummy coeﬃcient minus the credit crunch
dummy coeﬃcient) reduces the predicted proportion of classiﬁed loans
from 3.9 percent to 3.322 percent. Similarly, the predicted weighted classi-
ﬁed proportion is reduced from 0.9 percent to 0.737 percent. These ﬁgures
are not economically signiﬁcant in terms of the reduction in the proportion
of loans that are predicted to be classiﬁed or receive less serious classiﬁca-
tions, on the order of magnitude of 1 percent of loans in both cases. Thus,
the data are consistent with very modest reductions in supervisory tough-
ness during the boom period in terms of classiﬁed assets.
U.S. Bank Supervisors 337Turning to the potential eﬀects of changes in supervisory toughness on
CAMEL ratings during the boom period, we note that the coeﬃcients of
the boom period dummy (1993–98) in the CAMEL models are both nega-
tive, and the coeﬃcient for the main equation (without the future perfor-
mance variables) is statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the CAMEL
ratings were harsher for a given bank condition in the boom period than
in the precrunch period, contrary to the classiﬁed assets results. More im-
portant for investigating hypothesis 2, however, is that the boom period
dummies are less in absolute value than the coeﬃcients of the credit
crunch period dummies, so they represent easier ratings for a given condi-
tion than during the credit crunch period.
To evaluate economic signiﬁcance, we again compare the predicted val-
ues of the CAMEL probabilities. We evaluate the predicted probabilities
with the coeﬃcient of the boom period dummy in place of the credit
crunch period dummy, evaluated at the median of the variables for the
boom period (as well as lagged CAMEL rating 2, region 1, size class 1,
and state agency examination). The predicted percentages of CAMEL 1,
CAMEL 2, CAMEL 3, and CAMEL 4 or 5 are 21.98 percent, 77.39 per-
cent, 0.63 percent, and 0.004 percent, respectively, with the credit crunch
dummy coeﬃcient speciﬁed, and 24.96 percent, 74.50 percent, 0.54 per-
cent, and 0.004 percent, respectively, with the boom period dummy co-
eﬃcient. These data suggest that bank conditions and economic environ-
ments were so strong during the boom period that even banks with lagged
CAMEL 2 ratings were predicted to have over a 20 percent probability of
rising to a CAMEL 1 rating without any change in supervisory toughness.
The eﬀects of any change in supervisory toughness are again rather mild,
consistent with supervisory easing resulting in improved CAMEL ratings
of about an additional 3 percent of banks receiving better CAMEL rat-
ings. The use of the binomial logit model for the probability of a satisfac-
tory versus unsatisfactory rating also showed very little eﬀect in this case,
moving the predicted probability of a satisfactory CAMEL rating during
the boom period up by less than 1 percentage point (from 92.1 percent to
93.0 percent).
Overall, the classiﬁed assets and CAMEL models are modestly consis-
tent with hypotheses 1 and 2. They generally show statistically signiﬁcant
results in the predicted directions but usually show only fairly small results
from an economic viewpoint. In most cases, the ﬁndings are consistent
with no more than about 1 percent of additional loans becoming classiﬁed
or put into more serious classiﬁcations during the credit crunch period and
similarly for the reduction in classiﬁcations during the boom period, for a
given bank condition and economic environment. Similarly, the data are
consistent with movements of CAMEL ratings for about 3 percent of
banks in the predicted directions as a result of any changes in supervisory
toughness, which is small compared with the eﬀects of stickiness in ratings
during the credit crunch period and the trend toward improved ratings
338 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scalise12. We also tried evaluating economic signiﬁcance by dropping the time dummies and
running the model separately for the precrunch, credit crunch, and boom periods, allowing
the coeﬃcients of all the regressors to vary. Although this procedure yielded mostly the same
qualitative results—consistent with toughening during the credit crunch period and easing
during the boom period—the quantitative results were often too large to be believable. For
example, at the boom period medians, the CAMEL models predicted a drop from 73.4 to
2.6 percent in the probability of a CAMEL 3 rating from the credit crunch supervisory
regime to the boom period regime. Presumably, these models simply did not work very well
out of sample.
from economic conditions during the boom period. These ﬁndings are gen-
erally conﬁrmed by a number of robustness checks not shown in the tables,
including our Heckman correction for sample selection problems.12
We brieﬂy discuss the other coeﬃcients shown in table 9.8, but note
again that many of the coeﬃcients are not shown. In the classiﬁed assets
equations, the coeﬃcients of lagged classiﬁed assets are positive and statis-
tically signiﬁcant, consistent with the expectation that a prior problem
loan portfolio would predict a current problem loan portfolio, because it
takes a considerable amount of time to dispose of problem assets. The
coeﬃcients of the lagged CAMEL 1, CAMEL 2, and CAMEL 3 are posi-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant in the classiﬁed assets equations. This sug-
gests that a past rating of CAMEL 4 or 5—the base case in the regres-
sions—has a positive eﬀect in encouraging banks to improve their loan
portfolios and reduce classiﬁed assets relative to their lagged levels. In the
CAMEL equations, the positive and statistically signiﬁcant lagged
CAMEL coeﬃcients are consistent with CAMEL stickiness—the higher
the past rating, the higher the predicted current rating. As expected, the
level of current classiﬁed assets has statistically signiﬁcant negative co-
eﬃcients in the CAMEL equations, consistent with banks with poor loan
portfolios receiving poor CAMEL ratings. However, the lagged classiﬁed
assets variable has a positive coeﬃcient. Given that the current level of
classiﬁed assets is in the same equation, this may be interpreted as reward
(punishment) for improvement (deterioration) in classiﬁed assets since the
prior examination. The variable for years since a prior examination has
negative coeﬃcients in the classiﬁed assets equations, consistent with
banks that have problem portfolios being examined more often, although
this does not appear to aﬀect the CAMEL rating. The coeﬃcients of the
supervisory agency dummies—OCC, FDIC, and FRB—suggest that
banks examined by the OCC and FDIC received worse supervisory assess-
ments (higher classiﬁed assets, worse CAMEL ratings) than those exam-
ined by the Federal Reserve and state agencies (the base case), all else
equal. This may reﬂect diﬀerences in supervisory standards or diﬀerences
in the quality distributions of banks with diﬀerent supervisors. Finally, the
coeﬃcients of the future performance variables generally suggest that
banks that are assigned worse supervisory ratings (high classiﬁed assets or
poor CAMEL ratings) will have higher nonperforming loans and charge-
oﬀs in the future, but may also raise their capital ratios. As noted pre-
U.S. Bank Supervisors 339viously, these variables are endogenous, so we reserve further judgment
until we treat them as endogenous variables later.
9.6.2 Results of Tests of Changes in Supervisory Toughness
on Bank Lending Behavior (Hypothesis 3)
Table 9.9 presents results from regressions aimed at addressing hypothe-
sis 3, the eﬀect of changes in supervisory toughness on direct measures of
bank lending behavior. We regress changes in bank lending on three years
of past changes in supervisory assessments and changes in bank condition
and economic environment. The main predictions of the hypothesis are
that a supervisory downgrade (worsened CAMEL rank, higher classiﬁed
assets) should result in smaller proportions of assets being devoted to
loans, a reduction in asset growth, and a larger proportion of assets being
devoted to government securities, and vice versa for supervisory upgrades.
Our regressions appear to explain very little of what drives changes in
lending behavior. The adjusted R2s for the equations in table 9.9 are gener-
ally less than 5 percent. Nonetheless, a number of the changes in supervi-
sory assessments are statistically signiﬁcant. The changes in classiﬁed as-
sets all have signs that are consistent with the hypothesis for all lag lengths,
and all but one of these coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5
percent level. That is, an increase in classiﬁed assets is associated with
decreases in the future C&I loan ratio, real estate loan ratio, installment
loan ratio, and asset growth ratio, and with an increase in the future Trea-
sury holdings ratio. These results are also replicated when changes in
weighted classiﬁed assets are speciﬁed in place of total classiﬁed assets
(not shown). In addition, we tried rerunning the loan and Treasury ratios
with diﬀerent denominators to ensure that the results were not just driven
by changes in asset denominator. We speciﬁed (C&It  C&It1)/GTAt1
and (C&It  C&It1)/C&It1 in place of C&It/GTAt  C&It1/GTAt1,
and so forth for the other lending and Treasury ratios, and the results
were robust.
To determine if the classiﬁed assets results are economically signiﬁcant,
we simply sum the coeﬃcients on the three lags of the change in classiﬁed
assets. Because the equations are linear, this gives the long-run eﬀect of a
change in classiﬁed assets (i.e., the sum of the eﬀects of changes one, two,
and three years hence). The results suggest that the economic impact of
changes in classiﬁed assets appears to be rather small. An increase in clas-
siﬁed assets of 1 percent of assets is predicted to reduce the C&I loan
ratio, real estate loan ratio, installment loan ratio, and asset growth ratio
by 0.08 percent, 0.14 percent, 0.11 percent, and 0.72 percent, respectively,
and to increase the Treasury ratio by 0.08 percent.
The eﬀects of CAMEL upgrades and downgrades on lending are not
very consistent. They sometimes predict changes in lending in the oppo-
site direction of what is expected, and the upgrades and downgrades

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.13. The one exception of a larger predicted change is that a CAMEL upgrade predicts a
decrease of 2.4 percent in the growth rate of assets, which is inconsistent with expectations.
sometimes work in the same direction (i.e., diﬀering in the same way from
the excluded case of no change in CAMEL). In most cases, the eﬀects are
very small, moving the ratios less than 1 percentage point in the long run
for a CAMEL upgrade or downgrade.13 Thus, the support for hypothesis
3 is mixed and weak. The changes in classiﬁed assets are consistent with
the hypothesis but are small economically, and the changes in composite
CAMEL ratings yield small, inconsistent eﬀects.
Table 9.10 presents the regressions for the eﬀects of changes in supervi-
sory assessments on measures of changes in bank risk—changes in the
nonperforming loan, charge-oﬀ, and total capital ratios. As discussed ear-
lier, these results combine the eﬀects of supervisory assessments on bank
behavior with predictions of how banks choose to adjust their risks. The
lagged changes in both classiﬁed assets and composite CAMEL ratings
generally have statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients that are consistent with
each other. A supervisory downgrade of either type is followed by in-
creases in future problem loans, and vice versa for supervisory upgrades.
These results suggest a dominance of the predictive ability of the ratings
over their eﬀects in persuading banks to change the risk of their loan port-
folios. That is, a supervisory downgrade predicts an increase in nonper-
forming loans and charge-oﬀs that is not fully oﬀset by any changes in
bank behavior to reduce their risky lending, likely in part because it takes
time to resolve existing problem loans. However, the results are not eco-
nomically signiﬁcant; a 1 percent change in classiﬁed assets or a CAMEL
upgrade or downgrade is predicted to change the nonperforming loan and
charge-oﬀ ratios by less than 1 percentage point.
The results diﬀer for the change in total capital ratio. The coeﬃcients of
the lagged changes in classiﬁed assets are statistically signiﬁcant and pre-
dict an increase in future capital, consistent with the possibility that an
increase in classiﬁed assets encourages banks to increase their capital ra-
tios, more than oﬀsetting the erosion of capital from the change in classi-
ﬁcation. However, changes in CAMEL ratings appear to have the opposite
eﬀect, with downgrades predicting a reduction in capital and upgrades
predicting an increase in capital. Once again, all of these changes are eco-
nomically small.
9.7 Conclusions
We investigate the possibility that overall changes in supervisory tough-
ness may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence bank lending behavior and potentially af-
fect macroeconomic orregional economic health. Speciﬁcally,we test three
hypotheses about whether U.S. bank supervisors changed their policies
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.and whether these policy changes aﬀected bank lending behavior during
the credit crunch period of 1989–92 and the banking boom period of
1993–98. We test these hypotheses using information on the supervisory
process, conﬁdential data on CAMEL ratings and classiﬁed assets from
bank examinations, and bank balance sheet and income data over the pe-
riod 1986–98. The data provide some support for all three hypotheses.
However, the data also suggest that the economic eﬀects of any policy
changes are likely to have been quite small, and likely do not explain a
substantial portion of the wide swings in aggregate bank lending to busi-
ness during the 1990s.
The data provide modest support for hypothesis 1, that there was an
increase in toughness during the credit crunch period. During 1989–92,
banks of a given measured ﬁnancial condition and economic environment
had statistically signiﬁcantly worse CAMEL ratings than in the precrunch
period of 1986–88, and in some cases also had statistically signiﬁcantly
higher classiﬁed assets. Similarly, the data give some support for hypothe-
sis 2, that there was a decline in toughness during the boom period relative
to the credit crunch period. During 1993–98, both CAMEL ratings and
classiﬁed assets are found to be better for a given bank condition than
during the credit crunch period.
Despite the statistically signiﬁcant support for these hypotheses, the
data suggest fairly small results in terms of economic signiﬁcance. The
ﬁndings are generally consistent with no more than about 1 percent of
additional loans becoming classiﬁed or put into more serious classiﬁca-
tions during the credit crunch period and similarly for the reduction in
classiﬁcations during the boom period, after controlling for bank condi-
tion and economic environment. Similarly, the data are consistent with
movements of CAMEL ratings for about 3 percent of banks in the pre-
dicted directions as a result of any changes in supervisory toughness. The
statistical and economic signiﬁcance ﬁndings are generally conﬁrmed by a
number of robustness checks, although some of the checks suggested
larger economic signiﬁcance.
The data provide mixed support for hypothesis 3, that any changes in
supervisory toughness aﬀected bank lending in the predicted directions.
Increases in classiﬁed assets are statistically signiﬁcantly associated with
decreases in the future C&I loan ratio, real estate loan ratio, installment
loan ratio, and asset growth ratio, and with an increase in the future Trea-
sury holdings ratio, all consistent with the hypothesis. However, our anal-
ysis of economic signiﬁcance suggests that these eﬀects are rather small,
with an increase in classiﬁed assets of 1 percent of assets predicted to
change these portfolio ratios by less than 1 percentage point each. The
changes in CAMEL ratings did not appear to have consistent eﬀects on
future lending behavior, although these eﬀects also appeared to be small.
We also tested for the eﬀects of changes in supervisory assessments on
344 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scaliseother measures of changes in bank risk—changes in the nonperforming
loan, charge-oﬀ, and total capital ratios. These tests combine the eﬀects of
supervisory assessments on bank behavior with predictions of how banks
choose to adjust their risks. The ﬁndings are statistically signiﬁcant and
suggest that supervisory downgrades in terms of either increases in classi-
ﬁed assets or worsened composite CAMEL ranks tend to predict more
future nonperforming loans and charge-oﬀs, and vice versa for supervisory
upgrades. These ﬁndings are consistent with a dominance of the predictive
ability of the ratings over their eﬀects in encouraging banks to change the
riskiness of their loan portfolios, likely in part because it takes time to
resolve existing problem loans. The results diﬀer for the change in total
capital ratio: lagged changes in classiﬁed assets are statistically signiﬁcant
and predict an increase in future capital, consistent with supervisory disci-
pline that encourages banks to increase their capital ratios, more than oﬀ-
setting any direct reduction in capital that may occur from classiﬁcation.
However, changes in CAMEL ratings appear to have the opposite eﬀect.
As with our tests of the main hypotheses, all of the measured eﬀects of
changes in supervisory assessments on bank risk appear to be small, with
a 1 percent change in classiﬁed assets or a CAMEL upgrade or downgrade
predicted to change the risk ratios by less than 1 percentage point.
The ﬁndings also suggest that to the extent that regulatory changes like
modiﬁcations of capital standards are enforced through the supervisory
process by assigning worse CAMEL ratings, these regulatory changes may
n o th a v em u c he ﬀect on bank lending or portfolio risk, because lending
and loan risk do not appear to be inﬂuenced substantially through changes
in CAMEL ratings. However, these regulatory changes could have strong
eﬀects through other channels.
These ﬁndings are subject to a number of caveats. First, our results of
testing changes in supervisory toughness are subject to bias because we
cannot exactly replicate the information set used by supervisors. Part of
what we measure as changes in supervisory toughness may be systematic
changes in bank conditions or economic environments that supervisors
use, but that are not speciﬁed in our econometric models. We address this
issue in a number of ways, by (a) including the level, trend, and peer per-
centile rank of the key ﬁnancial ratios speciﬁed in the supervisory proce-
dures, (b) including a large number of other control variables for bank
condition and economic environment, (c) bracketing the supervisory infor-
mation set using data on future performance, and (d) running many other
robustness checks. The main ﬁndings results are robust to these proce-
dures. We acknowledge that we cannot rule out that omitted-variable bias
exists, and we recognize the endogeneity of the measures of future perfor-
mance to the examination ratings. Ideally, we would include all the infor-
mation that supervisors have or use a measure of predicted future perfor-
mance in the absence of the eﬀects of supervisory changes. Nonetheless,
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and other prior studies that used supervisory data in controlling for the
information used by supervisors.
Our discussant, Steve Cecchetti, correctly points out that the estimated
coeﬃcients of our time dummies—which we interpret as reﬂecting
changes in supervisory toughness in our tests of hypotheses 1 and 2—are
highly correlated with macroeconomic series, such as industrial produc-
tion. This is not surprising, given that the credit crunch period essentially
corresponds to a macroeconomic recession and the boom period for bank
lending essentially corresponds to a strong macroeconomic expansion.
That is, the time dummies virtually must be strongly correlated with mac-
roeconomic series if our hypotheses about changes in supervisory tough-
ness are true, because these hypotheses predict a supervisory toughening
during the recession and a supervisory easing during the expansion. These
hypotheses do not specify reasons behind the changes in supervisory
toughness, so if such changes are caused by supervisory reactions to mac-
roeconomic conditions, this is still consistent with the hypotheses. How-
ever, a bias may occur if the macroeconomic changes are strongly corre-
lated with signiﬁcant changes in bank conditions that supervisors consider
in making supervisory assessments that are left out of our econometric
models. Although such a bias may exist, we do not believe it to be substan-
tial because we control for state income growth, unemployment rate, and
state-average bank balance sheet and income items. We expect that these
state economic environment variables capture most of the eﬀects of macro-
economic changes on banks, because banks mostly operated within their
home states during the sample. That is, we do not expect a strong separate
and independent eﬀect from conditions outside the home state, which are
represented by the macroeconomic variables, given that we have controlled
for state conditions.
Second, part of our measured eﬀects of changes in supervisory tough-
ness on lending and bank risk taking may reﬂect the reactions of market
participants to changes in bank condition or economic environment that
are not captured by our control variables, rather than changes in supervi-
sory discipline (hypothesis 3). The fact that these models explain only a
small percentage of the variance in the changes in bank lending and the
changes in problem loan ratios tends to make this scenario more likely.
Third, our results are subject to sample selection problems. The propor-
tion of banks examined each year changes quite dramatically over time,
and the data suggest that a change in the sample selected for examination
may alter the quality pool of the banks examined relative to the industry
as a whole. Also, some banks drop out of the sample due to mergers and
failures, and others enter the sample through the creation of new charters.
We deal with these sample selection issues by including a large number of
346 Allen N. Berger, Margaret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scalisecontrols for bank quality, by including observations even when data for
lagged supervisory assessments are missing, and by using a Heckman cor-
rection for sample selection bias.
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Comment Stephen G. Cecchetti
In their ambitious and thought-provoking paper, Allen N. Berger, Marga-
ret K. Kyle, and Joseph M. Scalise ask the following three questions: (a)
Did U.S. bank supervisors get tougher during the credit crunch?; (b) did
they get easier during the banking boom?; and (c) did it matter to bank
lending? Their answers are yes, yes, and maybe.
These questions are of interest both to students of banking and to re-
searchers interested in macroeconomic phenomena more generally. In the
latter case, the hope is that this work will shed additional light on the
monetary transmission mechanism. Speciﬁcally, proponents of the lending
view of the transmission mechanism posit that loan supply shifts are an
important channel for the transmission of monetary policy changes to the
real economy. Unfortunately, there are virtually no studies that have been
able to distinguish loan supply from loan demand shifts in a convincing
fashion—all we know for sure is that contractionary monetary policy pre-
cedes a reduction in the overall quantity of loans made by banks. The
hope is that a change in supervisory toughness that is unrelated to any
other macroeconomic variable will provide an instrument, in the econo-
metric sense, that shifts loan supply but not loan demand. In these com-
ments, I will begin with a brief overview of the methods the authors use
to reach their conclusions, and then move on to evaluate what I believe
c a nb el e a r n e df r o mt h ep a p e r .
Berger, Kyle, and Scalise examine a panel data set composed of 5,500
to 9,500 banks from 1986 to 1998. Employing the data both from examina-
tions directly and from the call reports, they look for changes in supervi-
sory toughness and bank lending behavior over three periods: 1986–88,
their base period; 1989–92, the period generally thought to include a credit
crunch; and 1993–98, a boom period for banks and nearly everyone else.
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harsh (hypothesis 1) and then more lax (hypothesis 2), Berger, Kyle, and
Scalise study classiﬁed assets and CAMEL ratings. As they discuss in de-
tail, the ﬁrst of these is a supervisory measure of bank asset health,
whereas the second is an overall measure of bank soundness. In an attempt
to uncover changes in the stance of examiners, the authors estimate two
models. The ﬁrst is a linear regression in which they estimate determinants
of (scaled) classiﬁed assets, and the second is a probability model in which
they try to measure the odds of a shift in a bank’s CAMEL rating. Each
of their hypotheses is tested by examining dummy variables for the
1989–92 and 1993–98 subperiods. Included in their estimation as controls
are numerous bank balance sheet variables as well as measures of regional
economic conditions.
The results, reported in table 9.8 of the paper, are encouraging. Berger,
Kyle, and Scalise ﬁnd that total classiﬁed assets fell in the 1993–98 period.
They also ﬁnd that the CAMEL rating for a bank with a given balance
sheet in a given region of the country was on average worse in the crunch
period 1989–92. Unfortunately, there is no real evidence that classiﬁed
asset levels went up during the crunch period or that CAMEL ratings went
down during the period of ease. Nevertheless, things do look pretty good.
But, as the authors point out, when we look further, the results suggest
that the change in supervisory stance is statistically, but not economically,
signiﬁcant. That is, the eﬀects can be measured precisely, but are small.
To show this, they compute that the change from the precrunch to the
crunch period increases the percentage of classiﬁed assets by about 0.04
percent. Since the mean in the data set as a whole is about 6 percent,
however, this is not a big number. For the CAMEL ratings, again the prob-
ability of a shift is also small.
It is worth pausing for a moment and considering two important issues
that bear on their results: sample selection problems, and the question of
what else was going on during this period. With respect to sample selec-
tion, Berger, Kyle, and Scalise provide us with a very thorough description
of their data set and make clear a number of things that are going on.
They also spend substantial time in section 9.3 addressing sample selection
issues and are aware of the diﬃculties. It is still worth spending a bit of
time discussing one of the issues.
As shown in table 9.5, the number of banks examined (and, conse-
quently, in the authors’ data set) increased by about 50 percent from 1986
to 1993 and then declined by a similar amount. Furthermore, the fraction
of banks examined increased dramatically during the crunch period, from
43 percent in 1986 to 85 percent in 1993. Even more importantly, as is
reported in Panel B of table 9.5, the total capital ratio of the banks exam-
ined went up during the capital crunch, but the capital ratio for the indus-
try as a whole did not.
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that it biases the case against them. It does this for two reasons. First,
banks that incurred the most serious wrath of the supervisors—those that
were truly bad—will either merge with good banks or cease operation
altogether, and so they will drop out of the sample during the crunch pe-
riod. Second, the change in regulatory strategy meant that more banks
were examined, and so more good banks entered the data set. Overall,
then, the loss of the bad banks and the addition of the good ones will
m a k ei tm o r ed i ﬃcult to ﬁnd an increase in supervisory toughness because
the average bank is getting better and the worst banks are dropping out.
The fact that the mean CAMEL rating (table 9.4, Panel A) rises during
this period is additional evidence of what was happening.
The second important issue to consider here is what was going on
around this time. There were several important events, but they were at the
end of the authors’ crunch period. First, there was the passage of
FIDICIA in 1991, which Krozner and Strahan in this volume refer to as
“the most important revision of U.S. supervision and regulations during
the past two decades.” Associated with this was the implementation of
prompt corrective action and the risk-based capital requirements based on
the Basel Accord. All of these came essentially in 1992 and would lead
one to expect that the most signiﬁcant regulatory changes should appear
in the later part of the sample, not the middle.
Turning to the third hypothesis, Berger, Kyle, and Scalise look at bank
balance sheet variables to see if bank behavior was inﬂuenced by the
changes in supervisory toughness. Here they examine the changes in the
proportion of assets attributed to various types of loans and securities and
see if changes either in a banks CAMEL rating or in its level of classiﬁed
assets aﬀect balance sheet composition. I will focus my attention on the
changes in commercial and industrial loans (columns 2 and 3 of table 9.9)
and the change in U.S. Treasuries (columns 8 and 9 of table 9.9), both
measured as a percentage of total bank assets. The results are intriguing.
Looking at the CAMEL rating, we ﬁnd that any change, regardless of
whether it is an upgrade or a downgrade, results in a decrease in the per-
centage of assets held as C&I loans, and increases the percentage of U.S.
Treasuries. That is, simply having an examiner change the bank’s rating
results in a reduction in lending. Although one would expect this for down-
grades, surely it is not the expected outcome for upgrades.
As was the case earlier, however, the results indicate that the impact is
not quantitatively important. Changes in classiﬁed assets of the order we
actually see result in bank portfolio movements that are on the order of
0.1 percent of their assets, at most. Again, Berger, Kyle, and Scalise are
aware of this and discuss it in the paper.
The overall message of my comment thus far is that the authors’ results
do not seem to be quantitatively important. But I have left one question
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and shifts in loan supply, or could it be about something else? In all of
their work, Berger, Kyle, and Scalise do control for economic conditions
in a bank’s state, but they are unable to remove economy-wide activity.
How important might this be? To address this concern, I have taken the
annual time dummy variables estimates that come from an extended form
of the regressions reported in table 9.8, and I have computed their correla-
tion with a number of macroeconomic variables. That is, I examine the
relationship between annual measures of what Berger, Kyle, and Scalise
interpret as supervisory stance with measures of the state of the aggregate
economy. The results of this exercise for both the total classiﬁed assets and
the CAMEL regressions are reported in table 9C.1.
Looking at the table, we see that these dummy variables are highly corre-
lated with both growth in industrial production and core inﬂation. For
example, the contemporaneous correlation of the dummy variables with
growth in industrial production is 0.61 for classiﬁed assets and 0.72 for
the CAMEL rating. All of this suggests that what Berger, Kyle, and Scalise
are doing is picking up the supervisory reaction to the current general
economic environment. As a result, I doubt very much that what they are
ﬁnding are independent measures of toughness per se.
Table 9C.1 Correlation of Year Dummy Coeﬃcients with Macroeconomic Variables
Lag Lead
Correlation with: 2 101 2
A. Classiﬁed Assets
Risk spread 0.66 0.59 0.03 0.26 0.59
Term premium 0.79 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.75
Core inﬂation 0.54 0.65 0.50 0.25 0.04
M2 growth 0.35 0.34 0.12 0.16 0.54
Industrial production growth 0.16 0.32 0.61 0.68 0.27
Trade weighted $ 0.20 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.42
Unemployment rate 0.66 0.37 0.11 0.46 0.67
B. CAMEL
Risk spread 0.51 0.12 0.28 0.55 0.89
Term premium 0.61 0.39 0.06 0.43 0.85
Core inﬂation 0.32 0.42 0.30 0.13 0.32
M2 growth 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.66
Industrial production growth 0.05 0.31 0.72 0.43 0.07
Trade weighted $ 0.42 0.18 0.01 0.19 0.48
Unemployment rate 0.66 0.42 0.13 0.51 0.73
Source: Dummy variable coeﬃcients were provided by Berger, Kyle and Scalise.
Notes: Core inﬂation is measured by the median CPI; the term spread is the diﬀerence be-
tween the 10 year and the 3 month Treasury (constant maturity); and the risk spread is the
diﬀerence between the 3 month commercial paper rate and the 3 month treasury bill rate.
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Patricia Jackson began by noting that the CAMEL ratings reﬂect many
things and asked whether these ratings could be disaggregated.
Mark Carey wondered if the ﬁndings were possibly a sign of the times.
He noted that the press reported dire economic conditions at the time and
that these might be the true macroeconomic environment in which the
supervisors were operating. He also noted that the Basel Accord went into
eﬀect at year-end of 1990 and that FDICIA in 1992 increased the de facto
capital requirements. He observed that these changes might have improved
bank capitalization over the sample period.
Ed Ettin noted that the backlog of closures at the time might have forced
supervisors to delay writing down loans, which would have reduced capital
(and forced additional closures). He noted that this might have resulted in
the apparent anomaly of seemingly well-capitalized poorly rated (CAMEL
4 or 5) banks. He argued that macroeconomic conditions may not have
been fully captured by the included variables.
Eric Rosengren raised the idea of performing nonperforming loans such
as collateral impaired loans or loans with no required payments, such as
construction loans. He noted that in practice these loans may have been
captured as special mention loans, reserved against by the banks, and re-
ﬂected in bank capital. He observed that these loans would be reﬂected in
the CAMEL ratings, but not captured by the regression analysis that was
used in the paper and focused on classiﬁed loans.
Joe Peek suggested that the authors should focus on the thresholds for
diﬀerent ratings rather than the level. He argued that the average quality
of a given rating might not be of as much interest as the marginal cutoﬀs
between ratings. He suggested that the key question is whether the thresh-
olds between adjacent ratings changed, or possibly changed diﬀerently de-
pending on the rating? He raised a second question about the use of loans
as a share of assets. Although it will be important to scale the volume and
changes of lending, he observed that if the balance sheet is shrinking faster
than a bank’s loans, the ratio may in fact be increasing. He suggested that
the authors might look at the changes in loans scaled by lagged total assets
as opposed to the change in the ratio.
Michael Dooley wondered if the forecast of the macroeconomy by super-
visors was biased. He also wondered whether supervisors think the econ-
omy was in fact worse than the true prediction or the actual economic
condition. He noted that past-due loans might not be the best measure of
future conditions.
James Barth also suggested looking at the components of the CAMEL
ratings, noting that classiﬁed loans are most directly linked to the C (capi-
tal) rating. He also suggested looking at the examiners’ comments because
they may reﬂect more information than the CAMEL ratings. He pointed
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speciﬁc banks. Finally, he followed up on a comment from the discussant
(Stephen Cecchetti) on sample selection bias, noting that bad assets do
not drop out of the banking system as a particular institution is resolved.
Randy Kroszner commented on the incentives facing the regulators, sug-
gesting a further analysis of the asymmetric loss and resource constraints
faced by the supervisors. James Wilcox noted that the regulatory agencies
with more asset downgrades were not the same agencies with the most
CAMEL rating downgrades. He noted further that these ﬁndings suggest
that standards diﬀered across agencies during this time period.
Charles Calomiris raised an issue that is addressed in chapter 8: Is it
desirable to combine central banking and bank supervision? He noted that
recently most industrialized countries have been removing the bank regu-
latory authority from the central bank on the theory that there is a conﬂict
of interest between bank regulatory policy and monetary policy.
Doug Diamond asked if the use of the ratings changed over time, and
if the outcomes change. He also wondered if there were a change in the
persistence of the ratings.
Finally, following on a point made by the discussant about the impor-
tance of managing systemic risk, Marc Saidenberg suggested looking at
CAMEL ratings by the size of the institution. He noted that if supervisors
were more concerned about systemic risk, they might have approached
larger institutions diﬀerently.
In response, Allen Berger agreed with many of the suggestions. He noted
that he and his colleagues were working on a number of the suggestions
already, including the size interactions. In response to Ettin and others, he
agreed with the challenge associated with classiﬁed assets and the con-
straints that the supervisors may have faced.
He agreed that the ‘performing nonperforming’ loans were a potential
problem and that the authors will be looking at thresholds between ratings.
He also said that the authors would look at lending and asset behavior
separately. He noted that they also would be addressing sample-selection
bias.
Berger also agreed with comments by Wilcox and Calomiris. He noted
that although diﬀerences between agencies are controlled for in the paper,
it will be diﬃcult to address this issue because banks are not randomly
assigned charter types. He noted that he liked Diamond’s suggestion to
look at these as a function of capital requirements. Berger also noted that
generally it is interesting that many of the new capital requirements were
in place by 1992, the same time that supervisors appear to be getting eas-
ier. He argued that one explanation could be that by 1992 the banks were
getting their houses in order so that possibly there is a missing variable, or
supervisors felt that they could relax. Berger also responded to the point
by Cecchetti and others that the estimated changes in supervisory tough-
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that this is not inconsistent with the hypotheses. The measured eﬀects vir-
tually have to be strongly correlated with macroeconomic series if the
hypotheses are true, because the hypotheses predict a supervisory tough-
ening during the recession and a supervisory easing during the expansion.
If the changes in supervisory toughness are caused by reactions to macro-
economic conditions, this is still consistent with the hypotheses. A bias
might occur if the macroeconomic changes are strongly correlated with
signiﬁcant changes in bank conditions that supervisors consider in making
supervisory assessments that are left out of our econometric models. He
argued that although such a bias may exist, it is not believed to be substan-
tial in part because they control for home state economic conditions, and
in part because the information on future nonperforming loans and
charge-oﬀs are better proxies for the bank conditions that supervisors con-
sider than are general economic conditions outside the home state. Also
in response, Margaret Kyle noted that they will attempt to disentangle
types of regulatory actions, recognizing that the movement from a 1 to a
2 may not be the same as that from a 2 to a 3. She noted that the use of
future performance measures is in practice both diﬃcult and endogenous.
She also observed that the authors will look further at the components of
ratings, but noted that the aggregate CAMEL rating is restricted to be
close to the C (capital) and A (asset quality) components. Finally, she
agreed that the charter switches would be an interesting topic for future re-
search.
U.S. Bank Supervisors 355